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"PROPER PURPOSE," FIDUCIARY DUTIES, AND
SHAREHOLDER-RAIDER ACCESS TO CORPORATE
INFORMATION
FredS. McChesngy
Keep a-knockin' but you can't come in.
Come back tomorrow night and try it again.
-Little Richard'
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Ms. Shareholder seeks access to corporate information.
Management refuses to provide that information, justifying its refusal
under the statutory provisions requiring that Ms. Shareholder have a
"proper purpose" to obtain the information sought.2 Shareholder files
a suit, pointing out that she is a part owner of the firm, and that
management works for the firm she owns. Of course, both points are
correct. But do they justify a court's ordering the firm to turn over to
Ms. Shareholder the requested information?

* Northwestern University: Class of 1967 / James B. Haddad Professor, Law School; and
Professor, Department ofManagement and Strategy, Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Research
assistance from Mitchell Ross and especially Ludmila Chuplygina is gratefully acknowledged. This article
was written for the symposium, "Contemporary Issues in the Law of Business Organizations," presented
by the Center for Corporate Law of the College of Law, University of Cincinnati. Other participants in
the symposium (Stephen Bainbridge,Jill Fisch, Peter Letsou, David Skeel) offered many useful comments.
Participants in presentations at Emory and Vanderbilt Universities provided valuable assistance.
Conversations with William Carney, Lawrence Hamermesh, James Hanks and Ellen Taylor, and
particularly with Randall Thomas andJustice Randy Holland of the Delaware Supreme Court, have been
very helpful.
1. Little Richard, Keep A-Knockis' (Richard Penniman, BMI). Accord, Smiley Lewis, I Hear mou
Knocking (Dave Bartholomew & Pearl King, BMI) ("I hear you knocking, but you can't come in."); Jim
Lowe, The Green Door (Bob Davie & MarvinJ. Moore, BMI) ("Knocked once, tried to tell them I'd been
there; Door slammed, hospitality's thin there; Wonderjust what's going on in there."); The Sensations,
LetMe In (Yvonne Baker, Alphonso HowellJr. & George Minor, BMI) ("Open up, I want to come in again;
I thought you were my friend"). e also The Genies, 14ho's That Knocking (Claude Johnson, Fred Jones &
Leroy Kirkland, BMI) ("I hear approaching footsteps; boom boom boom, bang bang bang, on my door.").
But see Mary Hopkin, Knock Knock Who's There (ohn Carter & Geoffery Stephens, BMI) ("Knock knock,
who's there .... The door is always open wide .... Take off your coat and come inside.").
2. The focus of the inquiry here is Delaware law, whose pertinent statutory section for shareholder
access to corporate information is DEL CODEANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991 & Supp. 1998). Se also MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT§§ 7.20, 16.01-16.03 (1984 & Supp. 1997). Both Delaware and the Model Business Corporate
Act require a "proper purpose" for shareholder access to information maintained by the corporation. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991) (defining "proper purpose").

1199

1200

UNIVERSITY OFCINCINNATI LA WREVIEW

[Vol.68

The law in this respect is relatively clear and simple.3 As explained
in Section II, a court's reaction to shareholder suits seeking corporate
information depends (a) on the type of information sought, and (b) on
the perceived purpose for the shareholder request. Some purposes are
deemed insufficient to require equitable intervention by courts to force
corporate disclosure of the information demanded. Adopting a
contractual model of the corporate firm, Section III explains how the
law ordinarily comports well with what shareholders as a group would
want corporate management to do when individual shareholders request
information.
But suppose that, extraordinarily, Ms. Shareholder is interested in
taking over the firm, perhaps by a tender offer, and seeks corporate
information to decide whether to bid for the firm, and if so, at what
price. As Section IV explains, shareholder access to information in the
context of possible takeover bids presents a different situation from that
presented in the majority of shareholder information-access cases.
Courts have not analyzed shareholder-raider demands for information
very convincingly, as evidenced by a series of recent Delaware decisions:
BBCAcquisition Corp. v. Durr-FillauerMedical, Inc.,4 Thomas &Betts Corp. v.
Leviton Manufacturing Co.,' Golden Cycle, LL C. v. Global Motorsport Group,
Inc.,6 and NiSource CapitalMarkets, Inc. v. Columbia Energ, Group.'
To summarize, this article makes two arguments. The first concerns
the statutory law of shareholder access to information. Shareholders
generally have liberal access to relatively routine information, such as
shareholder lists. But the law governing individual shareholder access
to information about the firm itself, such as that contained in corporate
books and records, reflects judicial suspicion as to the purpose for
requesting the information. That is as it should be, because individual
shareholders might otherwise take advantage of other shareholders by

3. For a recent overview and citations to the cases and literature, see Randall S. Thomas, Improving
Share~olderMonitoingof CorporoleManagement by Expanding Statutoy Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331

(1996). Professor Thomas' excellent overview does not discuss the relatively narrow situation ofparticular
interest here, access to information as part of corporate takeovers.

4. 623 A.2d 85 (Del. Ch. 1992).
5. 681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996).
6. No. CIV.A. 16292, 1998 Del Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch.June 18,1998). The facts of the case can
be found in three opinions. The court denied Golden Cycle's motion for a preliminary injunction first in
Golden Cycle, LLC. v. Allan, No. CIV.A. 16301, 1998 WL 276224 (Del. Ch.May 20, 1998) (as described in
infta notes 107-16 and accompanying text), and again in Golden Cycl, LLC. v. Allan, No. CIV.A.16301,
1998 WL892631 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998). The third decision concerned subsequent related litigation that
likewise resulted in a denial of access to the information sought. See Global Motorsport Group, 1998 Del Ch.
LEXIS 92 (letter-opinion of Vice-Chancellor Stephen P. Lamb to counsel for Golden Cycle and Global
Motorsport).

7. No. CIV.A.17341, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198 (Del. Ch., Sept. 24, 1999).
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seeking access to information for purely personal purposes. Unrestricted
access to corporate information risks to benefit the requesting
shareholder while all other shareholders bear the costs, which may well
be greater than the benefits to the individual shareholder seeking access.
Courts have perceived information requests from a single shareholder
motivated by a possible takeover in the same way. But in some
situations, that perception may be erroneous. Admittedly, when
information is requested as part of a possible takeover, the requesting
shareholder is motivated by her own personal welfare. But access to the
information requested can benefit the other shareholders, too. Thus,
courts should be less tolerant of management refusals to provide
information than they currently are when Ms. Shareholder seeks
information for possible takeover purposes.
The second point of the article concerns not shareholders' statutory
rights to information but management's common-law obligation to
provide that information when it is sought in the context of a takeover.
In a takeover situation, management is held to certain fiduciary duties
toward shareholders. Yet in the shareholder-raider cases noted above,
as apparently in all other shareholder-raider demands for information,
courts have ignored management's common-law fiduciary duties toward
shareholders.
Shareholders' statutory rights to information in a takeover context
and management's common-law fiduciary duties incident to takeovers
are not mutually exclusive, but are complementary. Both should be
evaluated as part of management's overall obligation to maximize the
value of the firm to its shareholder-owners. The rest of this article
explains (a) when shareholders would want a shareholder-raider to get
access to corporate books and records, and (b) how courts-notably,
Delaware courts-have failed to appreciate how management as
fiduciaries should react so as to maximize shareholder value when a
shareholder-raider seeks corporate information.
II. THE LAW OF SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO CORPORATE
INFORMATION

Modem statutes give shareholders greater access to information than
they had at common law,8 but access is neither total nor automatic.

8. See 18A AM.JUR. 2D Corporations§ 349 (1985). For an interesting discussion of the history of

shareholders' rights to corporate information, first at common law and then by statute, see Thomas, supra
note 3, at 335-49. For a goodjudicial discussion ofthe evolution ofstate corporation statutes with respect

to shareholder access to information, see MMIlnvestments, LL C. v. Eastern Co., 701 A.2d 50 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1996).
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And so, the issue of information access engenders considerable litigation.
Indeed, the statutes are sufficiently general that litigation has been
required to define precisely when access can or must be granted.
The statutes are generally of two sorts. Some, such as the Model
Business Corporation Act, first specify information that must be
provided to shareholders as long as they conform to minimal procedural
requirements, such as adequate notice.' Information automatically
available includes the current articles of incorporation, by-laws, names
and addresses of directors and officers, and similarly uncontroversial
matters.'0 Under the Model Act, access to all other information requires
a "proper purpose.""
A second statutory model is that found in Delaware. Unlike the
regime established by the Model Act, Delaware firm management is not
statutorily required to provide any information without a showing of a
"proper purpose.'2 However, if a shareholder seeks inspection of a
Delaware firm's stock ledger or list of stockholders, the firm has the
burden of proof that the purpose is improper.'"
Although the statutes in the Model Act states and Delaware have
their differences, their practical workings are rather similar. True,
management in Model Act states must provide some information upon
shareholder demand.
But this information-the articles of
incorporation, board members' names and addresses, and so forth-is
generally of little interest to shareholders. Beyond this sort of largely
uncontroversial information, both the Model Act and Delaware
statutory regimes subject informational access to the "proper purpose"
requirement.
In that great majority of cases when a proper purpose is required, two
sorts of corporate information are recognized, with correspondingly
different rights of shareholders to obtain information. 4 Relatively

9. See, e.g.,MODELBUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.20, 16.02(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997). "The substance ofthe
Model Business Corporation Act's ("MBCA") statutory provisions [concemingshareholders' right to obtain
information) arc typical of those used in many states. The MBCA contains provisions defining corporate
records, the inspection rights of shareholders and the scope of those rights, and the procedures for courtordered inspection." Thomas, supra note 3, at 340.
10. &e MODEL Bus. COP. ACT § 16.01(e) (1984 & Supp. 1997).

I1. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(c)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1997).
12. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991).
13. &e DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998). As under the Model Business
Corporate Act, supra note 9, the shareholder must also comply with certain procedural ("form and
manner") requirements.

SeeJeffreyJ. Clark, Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton: A Straightfonvar

ClarjfingStatudtoy IntrpretationofSection 220(B) and (C), 20 DEL.J. CORP. L. 622, 623-24 (1995).
14. Also, modem corporate statutes require that firms keep certain information that shareholders
might want. See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, §219 (1991); MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 16.01 (1984 & Supp.

1997).
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routine information, notably shareholder lists, is relatively easy for
shareholders to obtain. To quote a recent non-Delaware case, "[t]he
right of a shareholder to examine the corporation's list of shareholders
for a proper purpose is to be liberally construed."'"5 The same rule holds
in Delaware.' 6 Another category of information, however, is more
difficult for a Delaware shareholder to obtain. When seeking inspection
of more sensitive information from the firm's books and records, such as
accounting information or minutes of board meetings, a shareholder not
only must have a "proper purpose," but also "has the burden of
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a proper purpose entitling
the stockholder to an inspection of every item sought." 7
In brief, some types of information are easier for shareholders to
obtain than others. But the distinctions are judicial, not statutory.
Information that shareholders typically seek is all subject to the statutory
requirement of showing a proper purpose. The commonality of the
''proper purpose" requirement increasingly has meant that different
states' information-access cases tend to focus on the same issues. As
Robert Clark writes, "[w]hatever the variations in statutory procedure,
proper purpose has become the substantive touchstone in most
jurisdictions." 18
What, then, constitutes a "proper purpose"? The statutes are of little
help. The Model Act does not define what purpose is "proper," and the
Delaware statute defines it as "a purpose reasonably related to [one's]
interest as a stockholder,"' 9 leaving it to courts to define what that
means. The cases have tended to identify two proper purposes.2"
The first relates to shareholders' seeking information related to the
value of their investment, particularly when a firm is closely held and so

15. MMI Investments, L.L.C. v. Eastern Co., 701 A.2d 50, 59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996). An issue
that often arises in information-access cases is what the demanding shareholder's "true" purpose is. This
is naturally a question of fact that courts ordinarily have little difficulty resolving. Relatedly, shareholderdemanders sometimes have multiple interests in demanding information. Courts ordinarily look only at
the shareholder's "primary" interest," and if that primary purpose is proper will order access to information
without regard to any additional, subsidiary purposes. See, e.g., CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d
788 (Del. 1982).
16. See, e.g.,.Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d I (Del. 1993); Davey v. Unitil Corp.,
585 A.2d 858 (N.H. 1991); Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 346 N.E.2d 507 (N.Y. 1976).
17. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1028 (Del. 1996). Accord, CM &
M Group, 453 A.2d 788; Skouras v. Admiralty Enter., Inc., 386 A.2d 674 (Del. Ch. 1978).
18. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3. 1, at 100 (1986). Seegenera/y W.E. Shipley,

Annotation, Prposesfor h'7ch Stockholder or Offer May xercise Right to Examine CorporateBookr andRecords, 15
A.L.R.2D § 11 (1951).

19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991). See Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 240 A.2d 755
(Del. 1968).
20. A good summary of the case holdings is found in Thomas, supranote 3, at 334-35. See also Clark,
supra note 18, § 3.1, at 100 (providing four-part taxonomy ofthe cases).
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market information about the value of shares is not available." When
a shareholder seeks information for purposes that are entirely personal,
or when disclosure of the information would actually hurt the firm (and
so degrade investment values), the purpose is not proper.22 The second
reason deemed legitimate to force disclosure of corporate information
concerns shareholders' desire for information in order, not to value their
own investment, but to communicate with other shareholders.
However, shareholders' purpose to communicate with other
shareholders still must relate to the underlying investment purpose of
their share ownership. Communications for purposes unrelated to
shareholders' investment, such as advancement of wider "social" goals,
will not suffice to gain access to non-routine information such as
corporate books and records.23
Clark summarizes the distinction between the routine items to which
shareholders have liberal access because their purpose is "proper," such
as shareholder lists, and the more sensitive items to which access is more
difficult under the "proper purpose" requirement:
[T]he list of things subject to the "easy" inspection right leaves out
some important items, including those that management might be
most reluctant to show. The accounting records and the minutes of
the directors' meetings, for example, are records in which a
shareholder contemplating a lawsuit against management would be
most interested. The record of shareholders might be of special
interest to a shareholder contemplating a proxy contest against
management or a hostile takeover bid.24
In the present article, the interest is the last situation mentioned,
takeovers, but more specifically takeovers attempted by shareholders of
the target firm. To further those attempts, Ms. Shareholder may seek
access to more sensitive corporate information that corporate
management may refuse to provide. In those circumstances, the law of
shareholder access to corporate information has been unambiguous.
Management is accorded virtually absolute discretion to refuse
information, a legal rule tantamount to per se legality when
management denies access to the information sought. The law on this

21. See, e.g., Statc ex. rel. Rogers, v. Sherman Oil Co., 117 A. 122 (Del. Super. Ct. 1922).
22. See Clark, supra note 18, § 3.1, at 102 (citing the relevant cases). A hypothetical example is
perhaps useful. The law would never accord shareholder access to financial information claimed necessary
for the shareholder to write a master's thesis or doctoral dissertation in business. While the purpose is
perfectly "proper" in many ways, it forces the corporation to incur the costs ofproviding information-costs
borne by all shareholders-for benefits received only by the requesting shareholder.
23. See, e.g.,State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 197 1).
24. Clark, supra note 18, § 3.1, at 97-98.
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point is discussed in Section IV with respect to the quartet of Delaware
cases noted in the Introduction. However, one cannot evaluate the law
of shareholder access to corporate information without a more general
model of shareholders' role in the corporation.
III. SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO CORPORATE INFORMATION IN THE
CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF THE FIRM

Corporations are a web of contracts that bind shareholder-investors
among themselves, and bind shareholders and the managers for whom
they vote to manage their investments.25 Shareholders acquire their
pieces of paper via contract, either with the firm at the time the shares
are first issued, or later from those selling the shares. In either event, the
terms of the contract as initially agreed to by the corporation and the
purchasing shareholders apply. When disputes later arise between
shareholders and firm management, the question is what rights
shareholders have, either via the initial purchase or via the subsequent
purchase subject to the initial terms.
In principle, issues of access to information could easily be resolved
ex ante by agreement among shareholders themselves. Under the typical
state corporation statute today, shareholders can write into the firm's
articles of incorporation almost any clause agreed to concerning their
firm's governance.6 Courts will enforce shareholder agreements, doing
so even when shareholders have not complied with statutory formalities
necessary to perfect their agreement under the prevailing statute.27 In
the ordinary case of contested access to information, inclusion in the
corporate charter of a liberal access provision would suffice for Ms.
Shareholder to get the information she sought. But such agreements are
apparently rare, if they exist at all. And so questions of information
access must be resolved later, by courts, on the basis of shareholders'
more general contractual rights.
A. ShareholderRights Generally
Ordinarily, shareholders have two principal contractual rights. First,
because shareholders are investors, they have the right to the
25. For further discussion ofshareholders' roles in the contractual theory ofthe corporation, see the

citations in Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and
CorporatePhilanthropyin the Contractual7heoy of the Corporation,84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1197-1202 (1999).
26. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (1991 & Supp. 1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)
(1984 & Supp. 1997).
27. See Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980).
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appreciation in the value of their shares that corporate performance
produces. Were shareholders unable to appropriate the increased value
of their investments, they would not invest in the first place.
Appropriating the investment value of their shares includes the right of
alienability that ordinarily attaches to any property.28
Second, shareholders have the right to vote, including a vote for their
agents who, as corporate directors, will manage the firm.29 Choosing to
own corporate shares is choosing to have ownership and management
of the firm legally separated; owners (shareholders) are not managers.
They choose the managers by voting for those who will serve on the
board of directors, and then await the hoped-for success their board will
produce so as to increase the value of the firm's shares.
In short, shareholders serve two roles in the corporation. They are
investors, and so have the right to increases in the value of their
investments. (As investors, they also have the "right" to suffer any losses
in the value of their investments.) And, as otherwise passive owners,
they have the right to choose the agents who will actively manage the
firm on whose success the value of their investment depends. In both
respects, shareholders seek to maximize investment returns.3"
Because shareholders' arrangements among themselves and with their
firm are a matter of contract, the arrangements discussed in the
preceding paragraphs may well be altered by contract so as to increase
shareholder returns. As investors, shareholders may agree to limitations
on their ability to transfer their shares, thus constraining their ability at
any given point in time to realize the investment value built up in their
shares.3 Courts will ordinarily enforce these agreed-upon limitations,
relying on ordinary concepts of contract and commercial law.32
Likewise, shareholders may agree to restrictions among themselves in

28. &egeneraly Guido Calabresi &A. Douglas Melamed, r p rRus,LiabiiyRuks, andlnalienabiliy:
One Vew of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Contract rights are a sub-set of property rights
generally. They can be alienated, and those who interfere with them will treated like any other interferor
with property rights. See Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contrat Versus "Effcient"Breach: Theory
and EmpiricalEvidence, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1999).
29. The typical state statute in fact requires that some shares be able to vote. See, e.g., MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) (1984 & Supp. 1997). Modem statutes allow shareholders to operate their firms
directly rather than through boards ofdirectors (e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 7.32 (1984 & Supp. 1997)),
but in those situations the importance of the ability to vote is all the greater.
30. Shareholders typically have other rights. By statute, ordinarily, they will receive the residual
value of the firm's assets should the firm liquidate. e e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 14.05 (1984 & Supp.
1997). But receiving their pro rata liquidation value of the firm isjust part of shareholders' more general
rights to the value oftheir investment. Shareholders also have a right to receive dividends -but only ifthey
are declared by management that they elect. And so shareholders exercise control over their firm's
dividend policies through their power to vote for management.
31. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1984 & Supp. 1997).
32. See, e.g., Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972).
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their second role, as voters. Arrangements like vote pooling, voting
trusts, special voting shares and the like will, again, ordinarily be
enforced by courts as a matter of contract.33
Two points follow from the fact that shareholders, within the nexus
of contracts called the corporation, function as passive investors except
for their active role as voters. First, as with any other contract, there
may be gaps. All contracts are incomplete. Not all events conceivably
(or inconceivably) possible in the future history of the corporation are
worth negotiating over, as their probabilities of occurring and/or their
consequences if they do occur may be relatively slight.3
Second, therefore, the role of corporate law will be to provide default
options, i.e., rules that govern disputes after the fact in areas that parties
to the incomplete corporate contract did not consider and agree to
before the fact. Two sorts of incomplete contracts are generally of
interest, the contract among shareholders themselves and the contract
between shareholders collectively and their agent-managers. As to both
contracts, disputes will be resolved according to what courts can infer
the parties would have agreed to, had the later-arising controversy been
anticipated and contracted for. And to resolve disputes, courts must
assume that shareholders-had they actually bargained among
themselves over the eventually-encountered problem, and then with
management representing shareholders collectively-would have
negotiated so as to maximize the value of their investments.
B. ShareholderRights to CorporateInformation
What would shareholders have provided, had they considered at the
time of establishing their firm the issue of one shareholder desiring
information and management refusal to provide it? One thing is clear:
information is like any other valuable resource. More information is
beneficial, but information is costly to produce. At some point, the costs
of generating more information fall short of the benefits of having more
information. 35 At that point, compelling production of information
would be wealth-reducing, and so shareholders would not want it
33. The important cases concerning vote-pooling agreements, voting trusts and other voting
arrangements are cited and discussed by Clark, supra note 18, at 772-81.
34. Se, eg., Benjamin Klein, Tracin Cost Dekrtinantsof "Unfair" Contracawi Arrangements, 70 AM.
ECON. REv. 356 (1980).
35. The literature isvoluminous. For starters, see GeorgeJ. Stigler, A Theomy ofInfonmation, 69J. POL
ECON. 213 (1961). The costs of providing corporate information are both pecuniary and non-pecuniary.
The former include out of pocket expenses of gathering and disseminating information, and the latter such

non-pecuniary costs as the risk of having the information leaked to competitors, revelation of trade secrets
and so forth.
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produced. The issues are thus how much and exactly what information
shareholders, in keeping with the corporate contract, would want
management to make available.
In analyzing how shareholders would bargain among themselves if
they established their own rules concerning later access to information,
it is useful to consider three different situations and the rules that would
be chosen for each. 6 For each of the three, it is assumed hypothetically
that the firm consists of three shareholders (A, B and C), each of whom
will contribute the same amount ($50) to establish the firm's initial
capital, once the article of incorporation-including rules for access to
corporate information-have been established. Each receives 50 shares,
worth $1 each. In each of the hypothetical access situations, the cost of
providing the information sought is $9. With these general assumptions,
consider three situations in which a particular shareholder might later
demand information from
the firm, and what rule shareholders would
37
provide for in advance.
1. Situation I: Information Costing the Firm More than Gains to
Requesting Shareholder
First, access to information that benefits one shareholder but harms
the firm as a whole (and so shareholders as a group) would never be
agreed to. Such a rule would be wealth-reducing, and so inimical to
shareholders' interests as investors.
Suppose that Ms. A, the shareholder seeking access to corporate
information, would get a gain of $5 from having the information
provided. She shares pro rata in the cost of providing the information,

36. The analysis uses an admittedly simple model ofvoting rules. It isassumed that any rule that
might have been chosen, had shareholders actually considered it,would have required unanimous consent.
This is perhaps not too simplistic, as no shareholder need assent to anything he does not want by way of
subsequent access to information. But a voting model based on unanimity should include the possibility
of log-rolling. Corporate charters are multi-faceted documents, detailed along several margins.
Shareholders might well trade offexpected losses conceming information access against expected gains in
other respects, but those more complicated situations are ignored here. For summaries of the basics
concerning voting rules and log-rolling, seeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDONTULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT (1962); Henry G. Manne, Some TheoreticalAspects ofShare Voting: An Essay in Honor ofAdolfA.
Berk, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
37. One simple rule might be that a shareholder will be given access to information as long as she
iswilling to pay the cost ofobtaining it. It is interesting that, for the most part, corporate statutes do not
condition access to information on the requesting shareholder's paying the cost of providing it. The
exception isshareholder lists. See DEL CODEANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991). This may indicate that the true
cost to the firm ofproviding information isnon-pecuniary and so less susceptible ofaccurate measurement.
See supra note 35.
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$9 ($3 per shareholder), but still comes out ahead. The following
summarizes the gains and losses to the three shareholders:
SITUATION I
Shareholder Gain/Loss
ShareholderA

$5 gain - $3 loss = $2 net gain

Shareholder B
Shareholder C

$3 loss
$3 loss

It is clear that shareholders, contemplating a situation such as that
described above, would never want management to provide the
information demanded by Ms. A. She gains on net by $2 (her $5
personal gain offset by her portion of the $9 cost to the firm of providing
the information). But Shareholders B and C lose $6 together, more than
Ms. A gains. Shareholders collectively would never vote for a rule that
required management to provide information to A in Situation I.
2. Situation II: Information Increases Value Only to One
Shareholder But Value Exceeds Cost
So, any rule concerning shareholder access to information would
have to increase firm wealth overall. However, a rule requiring that
provision of information increase wealth overall is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for shareholders to permit information access.
Individual shareholders are not interested in overall wealth increases
that do not redound to their personal welfare. Access to information
that benefited one class of shares but not another, even if access was
beneficial to shareholders as a group, would not be agreed to by
shareholders as a whole, all other things equal.
Consider Situation II, in which there are net gains to shareholders
from allowing Ms. A access to the information she seeks. Suppose now
that the gains to her are $10, against the $9 loss to the firm.
SITUATION II
Shareholder Gain/Loss
Shareholder A

$10 gain - $3 loss = $7 net gain

Shareholder B
Shareholder C

$3 loss
$3 loss

Although in Situation II gains exceed losses collectively, B and C would
not support a rule that allowed A access to information.
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Ultimately, if there are net gains from allowing access to the
information, those benefited may be able to compensate the losers. Ms.
A could compensate B and C for their losses (totaling $6) and still would
have a gain for herself (S1). But the fact that B and C could be
compensated does not mean that they would vote to allow A access to
information in Situation II. Shareholders would do so only if either (a)
Ms. A's access to information is conditioned on her compensating the
losers after the fact; or (b) the before-the-fact odds are such that,
expectationally, each shareholder still benefits. As an example of the
latter scenario, if A, B and C are equally likely to be the ones able to
gain $10 by getting access to the information, each shareholder will
favor a rule of liberal access ex ante, even if he ends up losing expost when
a particular problem causes application of the rule. 8
3. Situation III: Information Increases Wealth of All Shareholders
A third set of potential outcomes seems somewhat easier to analyze,
at least at first glance. Suppose now that when Ms. A obtains
information, the value to shareholders collectively of giving her access
is $15. If access to information sought by one shareholder would
improve the lot of all shareholders-both ex ante and ex post-all
shareholders seemingly would be in favor of that information being
provided.39
However, to say that shareholders would favor rules that make
everyone better off invites the question, "better off compared to what?"
Consider Situation III-A, in which all shareholders gain equally, that is,
share the total $15 gain and the $9 loss equally.

38. In more formal economic terms, a Hicks-Kaldor improvement, whereby some shareholders gain
and others lose, would not be the solution chosen by shareholders as a group unless losing shareholders
would be compensated by winning shareholders after the fact, or before the fact shareholders are
expectationally more likely to gain than to lose For a general discussions of Hicks-Kaldor superiority, see
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEvEN 0. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 45-50 (1997). The HicksKaldor criterion is ordinarily invoked to justify government regulation/redistribution that is allegedly
wealth-increasing overall but as a result of which gainers are not actually required to compensate losers.
But government action is coercive, whereas shareholder arrangements (for example, the articles of
incorporation) are contractual. So, while government actors can perhapsjustify coercive solutions on the
basis ofoverall wealth increases, even though losers are not actually compensated by winners, in contractual
settings losers will never agree to actions that increase wealth overall but work to their personal
disadvantage.
39. To resort again to economics, unlike rules that require merely net (Hicks-Kaldor) increases in

net wealth overall, the agreement in this third situation is Pareto optimal, improving the lot of every
shareholder.
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SITUATION III-A
Shareholder Gain/Loss
Shareholder A
Shareholder B
Shareholder C

$5 gain - $3 loss = $2 net gain
$5 gain - $3 loss = $2 net gain
$5 gain - $3 loss = $2 net gain

That is, there is a net total of $6 in gain to providing the information
($15 gain less the $9 cost of providing it), and stockholders share these
gains equally.
Compare Situation III-A with an unequal-sharing situation, such as
that portrayed in Situation III-B. Assume now that Ms. A will garner
$7 of the total $15 gain to shareholders from gaining access to the
information, or $4 of the gain on net.
SITUATION III-B
Shareholder Gain/Loss
Shareholder A
Shareholder B
Shareholder C

$7 gain - $3 loss = $4 net gain
$4 gain - $3 loss = $1 net gain
$4 gain - $3 loss = $1 net gain

In Situation III-B, as compared to Situation Ill-A, there is unequal
sharing of the gains from information access. Does that mean that
shareholders would prefer Ms. A not to have access if she will reap the
lion's share of the gains? At first glance, it would seem so. Shareholders
as a group would not vote for information access when the distribution
of gains was as portrayed in Situation III-B, if the alternative distribution
of Situation III-A was available. Shareholders B and C are better off
with the distribution as portrayed in Situation III-B.
However, shareholder insistence on more equal sharing ignores the
possibility that Ms. A herself is the cause of the gains. If A is able to
increase the value of the firm, while B and C are merely passive
shareholders, B and C can only gain if A undertakes actions that inure
to the benefit of all, albeit unequally.'
If A is not motivated to
undertake the actions that increase value collectively, no one-neither
A, B nor C--will gain anything. In that case, illustrated by Situation
III-B here, B and C would assent to allowing Ms. A access to

40. In more formal terms, Shareholders B and C will settle for a rule that gets them inside the
trading lens of the Edgeworth Box, even if most of the gains from subsequent trade go to Shareholder A,
if B and C would not be in the trading lens otherwise. Once inside the lens, B and C will prefer a rule that
gets them more of the gains from trade. But that isirrelevant.
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information, and the proportionately large share of the gains that would
follow.
It is precisely to avoid squabbling over a division of the gains that
shareholders would want to install voting rules ex ante. Squabbling expost
reduces the ex ante likelihood of gains for any shareholder. As long as
Shareholder A knows that she will reap the rewards of her activities that
increase value for all shareholders, she has the incentives to undertake
them. If she must contemplate the possibility of expost attempts of other
shareholders to extract from her the value of her actions, she has less
incentive to undertake them in the first place. B and C only gain to the
extent that A creates wealth. Shareholders, in short, would choose a
rule of informational access that left them all better off, but accorded
more of the gains to the shareholder responsible for creating the
wealth.4"
To summarize, shareholders would never agree to a rule that leaves
their firm (and thus themselves) worse off collectively. They might or
might not agree to a rule whereby some shareholders would gain and
others lose, as long as gains exceeded losses and either (a) winners
ultimately would compensate losers, or (b) the process governed by the
rule was such that before the fact each one could expect gains
outweighing losses. They would certainly agree to a rule whereby
everyone was certain to gain, as long as they could agree on the division
of the gains among themselves. An equal-sharing rule may make
agreement easier, but such a rule is not a requirement. Unequal gains
will be agreed to when a single shareholder is the source of the hopedfor gains, but she requires the incentive of possibly unequal gains in
order to create the gains in the first place.
C. Law of ShareholderAccess to Information
The law of shareholder access to corporate information closely
mirrors the three-part schema sketched in the previous situation. Again,
the law's role is to evaluate management action concerning access to
information according to what shareholders would have wanted, had
they anticipated the situations that arise. It is suggested here that
"proper purpose" for the most part is defined judicially along the lines
just described.

41. This principle isquite general, applying to change-of-control situations generally. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698 (1982); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 109-144 (1991).
Shareholders will prefer unequal-sharing rules when requiring equal sharing of the gains from control
changes will prevent (or diminish) creation of the gains in the first place.
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Thus, in a Situation I setting, access will be denied when the firm as
a whole (and thus shareholders as a whole) are made worse off.42 For
example, seeking information to aid competitors of the firm is not a
proper purpose. 43
The cases involving advancement of one
shareholder's notion of the firm's supposed "social purpose" also fall into
this category of improper purpose. ' One shareholder would gain by
having the information provided to further his social goal, while the firm
as a whole (and so shareholders collectively) would lose.
In the second category above, Situation II, gains accrue only to the
one shareholder seeking information and other shareholders lose, but
the gains to the one shareholder exceed losses collectively. Still,
shareholders might be compensated after the fact, or agree to a rule by
which expectationally they all gain. That situation typifies perhaps the
largest group of cases for which access to information has regularly been
deemed proper: information needed to value one's investment,
particularly in a closely held corporation.45 True, an individual
shareholder seeking information to value his shares imposes some costs
on other shareholders at the time access is granted. But unlike the
situation involving the firm's "social purpose," where only one
shareholder has a particular social concern, all shareholders are
potentially interested in valuing their investments and so all are
benefited ex ante by the ability to seek information to value their shares,
even if ex post some are made to pay for others' demands for
information. 6
In the third category of information-access situations, Situation III,
the firm and all shareholders are benefited by the demand made for
information by one shareholder. But in this situation, shareholders may
benefit equally (Situation III-A) or unequally (Situation III-B). As to the
former, the law has granted liberal access, under the "proper purpose"
heading, to shareholders seeking information that would benefit the firm

42. See, e.g., State exret. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 156 A. 170 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931); Skoglund v. Ormand
Indus., Inc., 372 A.2d 204 (Del. Ch. 1976).
43. See Shipley, supra note 18, § 15:
Consonant with the general rule that a corporation will not be required to submit its books
and records to the inspection of a stockholder who seeks such an examination for purposes
inimical to the corporation, it has generally been held that no inspection will be granted
where the stockholder is acting in the interest of a business competitor of the corporation,
seeking to discover its trade secrets or injure it in some other manner.

Id. (citations omitted). For citations to cases, see Shipley, supra note 18, §§ 13-15.
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. For cites to various cases, see Clark, supra note 18, § 3.1, at 100-01 nn.22, 24 & 25 and Shipley,
supra note 18, § 8.
46. Ifother shareholders are interested as well in valuing their investment, they also gain at the time
information is obtained.
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and all shareholders equally. A typical case is that in which the demand
is made to investigate suspected management incompetence or
wrongdoing, about which the inquiring shareholder will communicate
with other shareholders. 7 The gains to the firm from whatever the
shareholder learns about management shortcomings, presumably
reflected subsequently in management changes or at least in corporate
policies, are shared by stockholders in accordance with their holdings.
The legal rules thus reflect what one would expect from an economic
model of voting rules that shareholders as investors would choose. The
law recognizes basic property rights of shareholders as investors when
issues of access to information arise, and those rights are the ones that
shareholders predictably would create contractually among themselves.
Information access that would reduce share values overall would never
be chosen. Access that would increase the value of all shares would
always be chosen. Information that would benefit some but not all
shareholders would be made available when share value would be
increased overall and shareholders could expect before the fact that they
would benefit from access to information.
IV. ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN POTENTIAL CHANGE OF

CONTROL SITUATIONS

How does this model of shareholder agreements concerning access to
information fit the situation of particular interest here, information
sought by a particular shareholder also seeking -control of the firm?
Suppose that Ms. Shareholder approaches firm management to get
access to information, perhaps as a friendly bidder, but with the threat
of litigation in the event a friendly arrangement cannot be reached. It
is suggested here that the law, which ordinarily does reflect what
shareholders would want when an individual shareholder demands
information, may not fully understand what shareholders would want
in the shareholder-raider situation. But, as will be seen, the
misunderstanding is due at least in part to shareholders' failure to raise
the appropriate issues when information is sought as part of an overall
change of control in the firm.

47. For a discussion of the basic problem, see Thomas, supra note 3, at 332-33. For cites to cases,
see Clark, supra note 18, § 3. 1, at 100 n.23 and Shipley, supra note 18, § 7.
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A. InformationAccess and Change of Control: ShareholderLists
To appreciate fully the way the law operates when information is
sought in the context of a control change, it is useful to begin with
attempts to acquire shareholder lists as part of a proxy campaign to
depose current management. As noted above, when information as to
the identity of other shareholders is sought, a shareholder is ordinarily
entitled to stockholder ledgers or shareholder lists for a proper purpose.
That general rule is no different when access to corporate information
concerns a possible proxy fight. For the most part, the law has
permitted shareholder access to shareholder lists for mounting a proxy
campaign, 48 whether intended to oppose management
on a specific
50
issue 9 or to depose current management altogether.
There can be no question but that the desire to solicit proxies for a
slate of directors in opposition to management isa purpose reasonably
related to the stockholder's interest as a stockholder. It has been held
in this State [Delaware] that such a purpose is directly related to
stockholder status and, as such, proper."
Obtaining information to replace incumbent management falls under
Situation 111-A described above. Getting better management increases
the value of the firm, and shareholders benefit equally, according to
their respective holdings. Shareholders would surely contract among
themselves for access to shareholder lists when the information would be
used to replace inferior firm management. The law of access coincides
with what shareholders would have chosen for themselves.
Likewise, in other Situation III-A settings the law will order
production of information designed to effect, not just a change in
management, but a change of control. Seeking information to
communicate with shareholders about the benefits of a pending tender
offer is deemed a "proper purpose." 52 The same rule applies to a
48. &generaly Shipley, supra note 18, § 16.3.
49. Segeneralo 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporatiowu§ 386 (1985).

50. Referring specifically to Delaware law, Randall Thomas writes, "If the shareholder's purpose
in requesting the inspection was to obtain a stocklist in order to communicate with the shareholders to seek
their proxies to oust the management, the Chancery Court will order its production." Thomas, supra note
3, at 354.

51. Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 240 A.2d 755, 756 (Del. 1968). See generally Shipley,
supra note 18, § 17:

Since the management of a corporation acts as the agents or servants of the stockholders,
who should be permitted to place their affairs in other hands if they so desire, it has
frequently been held that a denial of the right of inspection is not justified by the fact that

it may be sought to facilitate a plan to remove the present offices or directors.
Id at 80.

52.

eeDavey v. Unitil Corp., 585 A.2d 858 (N.H. 1991).
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merger that would result in a change of control. A recent Connecticut
case, MMI Investments, LLC. v. Eastern Co.. involved shareholder MMI
Investments' demand for access to the Eastern Company shareholder list
in order to interest other Eastern shareholders in a merger with MMI.5"
The Connecticut court ordered production of the shareholder list,
agreeing that Eastern shareholders
should be apprised of the merger proposal since it may have a direct
impact on the value of Eastern stock, and, as a result, the proposal
would directly impact the shareholders' interests as shareholders.
Courts in other jurisdictions have permitted inspection of lists of
shareholders for similar takeover, stock related or control purposes. 54
MMInvestments, and the cases it refers to, concern access to shareholder
lists, information of the sort now routinely available to shareholders
under modern corporation statutes, not to corporate books and records.
But in ordering production of the information, courts necessarily hold
that obtaining information to depose management or to facilitate a
change of control can be a proper purpose under the relevant statute.
State corporation codes do not distinguish between shareholder lists and
other books and records, stating that access to all such corporate
information requires a proper purpose. Delaware draws a statutory
distinction, but only shifts the burden of showing a purpose is proper to
the shareholder when she seeks information other than a shareholder
list.55 It would logically seem that if obtaining a shareholder list to
effectuate a change in management or even control can be a proper
purpose, so could obtaining other corporate books and records for the
same purposes constitute a proper purpose.
B. Information Access and Change of Controk Hostile Bids
In the change of control situations described above-proxy
campaigns, tender offers from outside bidders-all shares would-benefit
equally from any change in control that resulted. They occur in typical
Situation III-A settings. But suppose now that access to information is
sought in a Situation III-B world, with all shareholders benefiting but
one shareholder garnering most of the gains.
That may be the result in a shareholder-led takeover. In a successful
takeover, the benefits to the raider are usually not the same as those to

53. &e MMI Invs., L.LC. v. Eastern Co 701 A.2d 50, 59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
54. Id. at 58.
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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the target firm shareholders. 6 To return to the figures used above to
illustrate Situation III-B, suppose that A will gain by $7 from the
takeover, and B and C by only $1. When the would-be acquiror is
already a shareholder, the takeover bid effectively separates
shareholders into two groups, one vying for control, and the others who
will have to decide whether to allow that change in control. The
equivalence of interest between shareholders that, in Situation III-A,
typifies rules allowing all shareholders access to information for
valuation purposes is gone. Passive shareholders will want the highest
possible offer for their shares; the raider-shareholder will offer the
lowest possible price for the shares at which she can obtain them.57
However, just because in Situation III-B shareholders no longer have
the same interests overall does not mean that their interests diverge
along every margin. In two respects, all shareholders' interests overlap
(although not perfectly) once a takeover looms.
First, passive
shareholders may want the raider-shareholder to have more information
about the firm. Takeovers are bargained-for transactions. There is no
set price at which a firm will be taken over: the transaction is
negotiated. In friendly takeovers, the would-be acquiror negotiates with

firm management over an offer to be presented to shareholders. In
hostile takeovers, different "raiders" present their offers directly to
shareholders, who choose whether to accept.
Provision of information in negotiated transactions is a delicate
proposition. "In bargaining, potential trading partners have two
contradictory incentives. Each wants to know the attributes of the items
the other offers and seeks. Transaction costs are lowered by quick and
easy discovery of the terms of trade. Hence, each trader has an
incentive to transmit some information expeditiously."5 " But, in seeking
the best deal for itself, each party may also have an incentive to limitthe
information available to the other side. Notably, an offeree may not
want to provide information that would facilitate an offeror's

56. The term "raider," is unfortunate, as "raiders" are often a shareholder's best friend. See, e.g.,
Clifford G. Holdemess & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? TheEvidence on Six ControversialInvestors, 14

J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985).
57. In fact, when a takeover attempt results in an auction for a firm, target-firm, shareholders ofthe
target firm typically benefit to a greater extent than does the winning bidder. The statistical evidence is
summarized in Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control" The Scienfic
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg Ajarrell, Do Targets Gainfroen Defeating
Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L REV. 277 (1984); Gregg A.Jarrell et al., The Markefor Corporate ControL" The
EmpiricalEvidence Since 1980, 2J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988). Ofcourse, when passive shareholders like B and
C gain more than does bidder A, B and C are all the more likely to favor a rule that gives A access to the
information necessary for her to complete a takeover.
58. David D. Haddock & Fred S. McChesney, BargainingCosts, BargainingBenefits, and Compulsory
NonbargainingRules, 7J.L. &ECON. ORG. 334,334 (1991).
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computation of the offeree's reservation price (the minimum price
offeree would accept).
How much and what kind of information is optimally transferred will
depend on the particular situation, and bright-line rules are impossible.
Bargaining is as much an art as a science. 9 Just as some firms will want
to keep information to themselves that would reveal their reservation
prices, so might others wish to provide that same information if they
believe the offeror would otherwise undervalue them.60
However, there is an additional complication that attends access to
information in the context of corporate takeovers. Although it is
essential to think about what shareholders would agree to among
themselves, the issue of access to information only arises when, in fact,
shareholders have not agreed to information access rules. In that case,
it is management, bound to act in the shareholders' interest, that must
determine whether access is value-enhancing in a way that shareholders
themselves (had they contracted explicitly) would find acceptable. "The
corporation's management must balance the interests of all shareholders
against those of the shareholder seeking to obtain the corporate
information."' 6' The voting rules discussed in the various situations
above assume that management will attempt to find the valuemaximizing solution for all shareholders, in the face of a particular
shareholder's demand for information.
But that perspective may not apply very well to shareholder demands
for information when the shareholder is also a raider. The construct of
bilateral negotiation between active bidders and passive shareholders
does not capture the complete nature of a takeover. In takeovers, it is
management that in the first instance bargains on shareholders' behalf,
and which therefore is entrusted with the art and science of negotiation.
Ideally, managers are disinterested agents, seeking only to maximize the
returns to shareholders as a whole. But, realistically, there is the
possibility that management-whose fate may well be affected by any
change in control-may not work as faithful agents, and may choose
sides in a control contest so as to maximize their own personal welfare.
Both passive shareholders and the raider need be mindful of the
agency costs that firm management can impose in the takeover
context.62 The law has shown itself mindful of these potential agency

59. S genera//y HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).

60. Otherwise stated, provision ofsome information isnecessary to reveal to the parties that there
are gains from trade (i.e., a trading lens in an Edgeworth Box). But provision of other information may
worsen a bargaining party's position within the trading lens.
61. Thomas, supra note 3,at 334.
62. &generaUyMichaelJensen &William Meckling, Thyf-otyoFtn.ManageiaBehavio Age nyCosts
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costs of firm management when a takeover looms, imposing fiduciary
duties on management to do what is best for shareholders, not itself.
The principal fiduciary duties are defined in two cases.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & ForbesHoldings,Inc, the Delaware court
disallowed various arrangements that effectively elevated the welfare of
management over that of shareholders in the context of a hostile
takeover.63 Once a change of control is inevitable6" the court held,
directors are "charged with the duty of selling the company at the
highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit."65
The Revlon decision recognized that in takeover situations
management may well favor their interests over those of shareholders.
By use of the devices challenged, (lock-up and no-shop clauses), "the
Revlon board ended the auction in return for very litde actual
improvement in the final bid. The principal benefit went to the
directors .... "I66But the Revlon court also showed a sophisticated
understanding of how the challenged devices employed by management
in the takeover context may be good for shareholders in some instances.
Discussing lock-up and no-shop clauses, the court stated:
A lock-up is not per se illegal under Delaware law. Its use has been
approved in an earlier case. Such options can entice other bidders to
enter a contest for control of the corporation, creating an auction for
and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
63. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). The relevant facts and holding of Revlon are summarized in the first
paragraph of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion:
In this battle forcorporate control of Revlon, Inc. (Revlon), the Court of Chancery enjoined
certain transactions designed to thwart the efforts of Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride) to
acquire Revlon. The defendants are Revlon, its board of directors, and Forstmann Little
& Co.... [Forstmann]. The injunction barred consummation of an option granted
Forstmann to purchase certain Revlon assets (the lock-up option), a promise by Revlon to
deal exclusively with Forstmann in the face of a takeover (the no-.shop provision), and the
payment ofa $25 million cancellation fee to Forstmann if the transaction was aborted. The
Court of Chancery found that the Revlon directors had breached their duty of care by
entering into the foregoing transactions and effectively ending an active auction for the
company. The trial court ruled that such arrangements are not illegal per se under
Delaware law, but that their use under the circumstances here was imprermissible. We
agree.
Il at 175-76.
64. The Revlon court said that, as the bidding firms' offers for Revlon mounted, "the break-up of the
company was inevitable." Id. at 182. A series of subsequent cases has defined the situations in which Revlon
standards apply. See, e.g.,Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Paramount Communications, Inc., QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Sante Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
65. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 n.16.
66. 506 A.2d at 184. As the court also wrote, "when a board implements anti-takeover measures
there arises 'the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders."' Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d at 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
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the company and maximizing shareholder profit .... [A bidder]

might only enter the bidding for the target company if-it receives some
form of compensation to cover the risks and costs involved.67
This approach to lock-ups and no-shop clauses in the takeover context
parallels the discussion above concerning access to information in
bargaining situations, including takeovers. In some situations, provision
of information is value-enhancing for shareholders. In others, it may
reduce value. A faithful agent (management) will maximize value to its
principal (the firm, and ultimately its shareholders) by diligent and
disinterested use of the techniques available. An unfaithful manager
may decline to make information available if there is some reason for
management to prefer one party seeking control of the firm rather than
another.
Economically, there is no principled distinction in takeover contexts
between management policies concerning provision of information to
bidders and other devices to maximize value to shareholders. All are
weapons in management's arsenal when a takeover bidder appears,
seeking a change of firm control.6" And under Revlon, there would seem
to be no legal distinction, either. In a takeover context, refusal to
provide information works like any other defensive tactic. Corporation
law accords management wide latitude to employ defensive tactics, as
well it should.69 Use of things like poison pills or greenmail benefit
target firms in some situations, harm them in others.7"
The law therefore should be-and is-mindful of the advantages to
shareholders provided by management's use of defensive tactics to resist
takeover bids, even if a takeover is not imminent and so Revlon duties are
not at issue. That distinction underlies the second sort of takeoverrelated fiduciary duty, defined by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.." In situations when a takeover is not
inevitable, management is free to use defensive tactics to rebuff a
takeover attempt, as long as doing so is consistent with its fiduciary
duties to maximize shareholder value.7 At some point, a takeover may

67. Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
68. As Thomas writes, management may be "hostile to the ideas that the shareholders are
proposing, [in which case management] can cut off their access to certain information." Thomas, supra
note 3, at 332.
69. Se generaly David D. Haddock et al., PropertyRights in Shares and Resistance to Takeover Bids, 73 VA.

in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (L. Bebchuk ed., 1990).
L.REV. 701 (1987), reprinted
70. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
YALE Lj. 13 (1985); Fred S. McChesney, Transaction Costs and Corporate Creenmai" Theory, Empirics, and a

M'wckg Mouse Case Sid, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 31 (1993).
71. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

72. "In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis begins with
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become a virtual certainty, at which point the directors' duties become
those defined in Revlon. But until a change of control becomes
inevitable, a board's Unocal obligations permit resistance to takeover
bids.
Management's fiduciary duties in cases of possible changes in control
are by definition important in the context of access to information by
shareholder-raiders. One advantage of many defensive tactics, of the
sort discussed in Revlon and Unocal, is their ability to slow down takeover
attempts and force hostile bidders to contract with
management--sometimes (but not always) to shareholders' advantage.
Refusal of access to information can work in that way, forcing raiders to
negotiate with management or go to court.73
The speed with which takeover bidders can construct and complete
their offers is a crucial aspect of success, and resort to courts is a
notoriously slow way of resolving disputes. Forcing a raider into court
is therefore one way that management can defeat takeover attempts.7
Even if management ultimately loses in court and is required to provide
the information sought, its loss legally may well be a victory practically.
Professor Thomas found, in his empirical investigation of attempts to
obtain information through use of the Delaware courts, that the
"median successful stocklist plaintiffs spend over a month in litigation,
while unsuccessful plaintiffs wait significantly longer."7 5 But access to
stock lists, as noted above, is the least controversial area of shareholder
rights to corporate information. Access to books and records, a more
controversial area, required over three months oflitigation for successful
shareholders, and over eight months for unsuccessful litigants. 6 One
suspects that access to information in a takeover context is even more
contentious, and so the time required for judicially ordered access to
information even more protracted.
In short, the optimal legal rule concerning shareholder-raider access
to corporate information would begin with a definition of "proper
purpose" by which management, as shareholders' faithful agent, was
the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation's stockholders." Id at 955.
73. An academic colleague very involved in drafting his state's corporation statute reports that,when
he pressed for more liberal shareholder access to corporate information, practitioner-members of the
drafting committee resisted, saying that limited statutory access increased the need to hire corporate lawyers
to get access to information. On the problem of special interests determining the shape of legislation, even
supposed "model" legislation, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of rivateLgislation,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995).
74. See Gregg A.Jarrell, The Wealth Effects ofLigation by Targets: Do InterestsDiverge in a Merge?, 28J.L
&ECON. 151 (1984).
75. Thomas, supra note 3, at 335.
76. See i
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required to accord access in situations where shareholders would want
the information provided. Shareholders would never want the
information provided when it reduced the value of the firm, and thus of
their shares (Situation I). Shareholders would always want the
information provided when all shareholders would gain as much as
possible. Division of the gains would be a matter for bargaining among
shareholders at the time of a takeover bid, admittedly, but avoiding the
necessity of strategic bargaining over the division of the gains would not
be permitted to defeat access to information that would leave all
stockholders better off. To avoid the very possibility of strategic
bargaining that could defeat any agreement at all, shareholders would
want a voting rule whereby all would gain. And in Situation III-B, if a
particular shareholder-call her a "raider"-was the source of the gains,
shareholders would not define her getting information advancing a
takeover as improper under section 220 or the Delaware Code (or the
equivalent statutory section in Model Act jurisdictions).
However, just because the raider's purpose is proper does not mean
that shareholders would always want the information provided. Section
220 does not purport to define the obligations that management has to
provide or deny information in takeover situations. Denying access may
be consistent with maximizing shareholder value in a takeover. At the
same time, shareholders in a control-change situation would be attentive
to the possibility that management would be more concerned with its
own welfare than with that of shareholders. So, the law governing
management's ability to defeat demands for corporate information
would take this possibility into account as well as whether there was a
"proper purpose" under the statute.
But balancing the pluses and minuses of providing information in
takeover settings is the domain of the law of fiduciary (Revlon/Unocal)
duties. Section 220 adds little, if anything, to what management, as
fiduciaries, already must do in a takeover setting.
C. InformationAccess and Change of Control: Delaware Cases
Yet the Delaware courts have resolved disputes over shareholderraider access to information solely in terms of section 220. Courts have
effectively declared that when a shareholder seeks information related
to taking over the firm, that purpose is per se improper. Those cases are
inconsistent with the proxy cases, ignore what shareholders would
themselves want in certain situations, and cannot be squared with
management's Revlon/Unocal duties that supposedly apply in change-ofcontrol situations. The cases have focused uniquely on the limits faced
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by shareholder-raiders seeking information, without considering
management's obligations."
1. BBCAcquisition Corp. v. Durr-FillauerMedical, Inc.78
Perhaps the most important case is the BBCAcquisition case. Bergen
Brunswig Corporation ("Bergen") sought to acquire Durr-Fillauer, Inc.
("Durr"), a publicly-held corporation. Durr had already agreed to be
acquired by Cardinal Distribution, Inc. ("Cardinal"). To compete
belatedly with Cardinal in acquiring Durr, Bergen formed BBC
Acquisition Corporation ("BBC"), bought 100 shares of Durr in the
market, and proposed a friendly cash tender offer for all of Durr's
outstanding shares at a better price than Cardinal had offered (andDurr
had accepted). When Durr management refused to deal with BBC,
BBC as a shareholder demanded to inspect various books and records,
in particular information on the agreement between Durr and Cardinal,
including the same information that Durr had furnished Cardinal in
connection with the Durr-Cardinal agreement. BBC's demand letter to
Durr management stated that the purpose of its request was inter alia
communication with other shareholders concerning (a) the DurrCardinal transactions "or alternatives thereto," (b) a possible proxy
solicitation for purposes of voting on the Durr-Cardinal deal, and (c)
BBC's valuation of its 100 shares.
Durr did not respond to BBC's shareholder demand, and refused to
meet with Bergen about BBC's tender offer. Cardinal then made a new
offer at a price topping BBC's offer. BBC did not rebid in response to
Cardinal's higher offer, taking the position that "to decide whether to
increase its bid, it must first be afforded access to the same nonpublic
information that Durr earlier provided to Cardinal ....

[which] is

essential to enable it to determine the target company's worth."79 The
Durr-Cardinal agreement, however, forbade Durr from negotiating with
or furnishing to a competing bidder the information that BBC sought,
unless in response to a written competing offer. In short, Durr
maintained that it could not provide the information without a new bid
from BBC, while BBC said that it could not make a second offer without
77. As will be seen, however, it is unclear to what extent plaintiffs have relied on management's
fiduciary duties in contesting denial of access to corporate information. In at least one case, however, the
issue was raised explicitly by plaintiff,and in another it was implicitly discussed by the court. See notes 89
108-109 and 117, and accompanying text.
78. 623 A.2d 85 (Del. Ch. 1992). For a lengthier discussion of the BBCAcqui.rin opinion, see
AndrewJ. Turezyn, Commentayftom the Bar. 1992 Developments in Delaware CorporateLaw, 19 DELJ. CORP.
L. 103, 128-129 (1994).
79. 623 A.2d at 88.
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BBC then brought suit to force access to the

The Delaware Chancery Court held that Durr was not required to
provide the records to shareholder BBC. Under section 220, said the
court, there was no showing of a proper purpose: "BBC's true (and
primary) purpose is to determine whether to reprice or restructure the
[BBC] Tender Offer, which purpose is not cognizable under § 220.""o
In effect, the BBC demand as part of a possible takeover was per se not
a proper purpose. The demand was unrelated to BBC's investor status,
because it was unnecessary to value Durr's shares, which were traded
publicly:
BBC's nominal stock interest is not what this inspection dispute is
about. This is not a case where an investor in a nonpublicly-held
corporation needs to inspect corporate books and records to value his
investment in order to determine how to protect or preserve it, viz.,
whether to sell his shares, buy more shares (or possibly seek control), or
take some other course of action. In that circumstance there is reality
to a petitioning shareholder's contention that he needs to value his
stock interest in the corporation because that interest (however large
or small it might be) and its preservation are of real significance to
him. In that situation, and in others where that reality drives the
valuation purpose, § 220 relief is available to aid shareholders who
demonstrate their entitlement to it.
That is not this case. BBC's characterization ofits purpose as being
one of valuing its interest in Durr obscures what truly is going on here.
To repeat, BBC is not seeking to value its 100 shares of Durr, but
Durr as a whole For purposes of§ 220, the chasm between those two
purposes is fatally unbridgeable: valuing a stockholder's interest in
the corporation is a proper purpose. Valuing the corporation for the
sole purpose of acquiring it, unrelated and without regard to the
acquiror's particular and pre-existing investment in the corporation,
is not. In terms of the present case, that latter purpose relates only to
BBC's status as a bidder for Durr, not to its status as a Durr
stockholder. Section 220 is intended to serve shareholders whose
need for inspection is truly related to their stock interest. BBC is not
such a stockholder. 8 1

80. Id. at 89. Durr raised other defenses to BBC's demand, but the Chancery Court held that the
"proper purpose" argument was legally controlling. See id.Indeed, said the court, Durr's other defenses
were largely without merit. For example, the Durr-Cardinal agreement that information not be provided
to a shareholder-raider unless a written tender offer had been made could not in itself defeat shareholders'
statutory rights to information. See id.. Other Durr defenses are considered later. Se infa notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
81. 623 A.2d at 91-92 (emphasis added).
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There are three objections to the outcome and reasoning of BBC
Acquisition. As the language in the court's opinion italicized above
indicates, the Delaware courts have generally recognized internal
attempts to mount proxy contests in order to facilitate a change of
control as a "proper purpose" compelling corporate disclosure of
information. There seems no principled distinction between control
changes through proxy fights from changes achieved without proxy
contests but nonetheless requiring access to corporate information.
Second, the absence of a principled reason to distinguish among
different paths toward control changes is perhaps clearer in light of the
true purpose of constraining shareholder access to corporate
information, i.e., the purposes that shareholders themselves would
impose upon themselves ex ante. Would passive Durr shareholders
choose to have Durr management provide the information sought by
BBC? It is hard to see why they would object. Durr was about to be
acquired by Cardinal,82 meaning that current shareholders were about
to surrender their shares at a price possibly lower than the price BBC
would offer-if BBC could get the information demanded. Having the
information turned over could only benefit Durr shareholders. If the
information enabled BBC to make a second offer superior to Cardinal's
second offer, the shareholders gain. If not, they lose nothing from
having the information turned over.83 The Chancery Court's opinion
makes it clear that, but for the information, BBC would not increase the
price of its tender offer without the information. Shareholders had
everything to gain and nothing to lose by having the information
provided.84

82. Technically, the Cardinal transaction would result in "a spinoff of certain of Durr's product
divisions, and a sale of the remainder of Durr to Cardinal in a stock-for-stock merger." Id at 87.
83. In theory, Durr shareholders could lose if the information turned over allowed Bergen to
compete better with Durr in the medical products market: the two firms were "in the same business." See
id. The value of the Cardinal shares that Durr shareholders were about to own (assuiming BBC did not
make a second offer higher than Cardinal's second offer) would be lower if release of the information to
BBC lowered the returns to a Cardinal-controlled Durr. But apparently Durr did not contend that such
was the purpose or possible outcome of BBC's demand; the point never arose in the case.
84. It is conceivable that allowing subsequent bidders access to the information Cardinal received
would have reduced Cardinal's incentive to undertake the takeover in the first place, and that shareholders
therefore would want management to deny that information to BBC Acquisition. Had the court resolved
the matter on that basis, there would be less to quibble about concerning the outcome of the case. But the
court explicitly held that any agreement with Cardinal not to reveal the information to BBC Acquisition
would not constitute a valid defense for Durr's management. More important, it is one thing to say that
management should be free to grant or deny access to information to a hostile bidder, such a holding is
entirely consistent with management's Revlon/Unocal obligations to shareholders. But the court's holding
in BBCAcquisiion says nothing of management's duties in a takeover context, relying solely on section 220
to deny the shareholder's request as lacking a "proper purpose."
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Therefore, it is hard to reconcile the holding in BBC Acquisition with
that in Revlon. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that once a
takeover was inevitable, managers' duty to shareholders was selling the
company at "the highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit."85
BBC had already indicated a strong interest in Durr shares, and had
made a first offer topping Cardinal's first offer. It said it might make a
second offer higher than Cardinal's, if only it could get the demanded
information.
It is noteworthy that Cardinal's second offer only topped BBC's first
offer because Cardinal, as a friendly suitor, was granted access to
information denied to BBC.86 The BBC court stated,
Without question the sought-after documents were needed by
Cardinal to determine Durr's value and, as a consequence, the price
Cardinal was willing to pay to acquire Durr. At the trial Durr's
President and Chief Operating Officer conceded that Cardinal
needed those documents-all nonpublic-for that purpose. That
being the case, Durr cannot credibly argue that those same
documents are not necessary for a competitive bidder that is
identically situated (BBC), or that BBC must be relegated to
inspecting publicly-filed documents when Cardinal was not so limited.
Thus, if BBC were found to be otherwise entitled to inspect the
requested documents, that defense [of Durr's] would pose no
obstacle. 7
This candid observation underscores the incongruity between BBC
Acquisition and Revlon. In Revlon, the court criticized the Revlon board for
dealing preferentially with Forstmann, even when it was clear that
Pantry Pride sought to bid actively for Revlon. Preferential "access to
financial data" was noted as one of the ways the board had been
"playing favorites with the contending factions." 8 But the Durr board

85. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
86. Courts have upheld board-adopted restrictions that apply equally to all bidders, such as
conditioning access to information on signing a confidentiality agreement. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (refusing to grant a preliminary injunction
against completion of a merger because "[m]anagement had offered to provide [plaintiff] Edelman with
the same information it had given other interested parties, but Edelman refused to sign a confidentiality
agreement" that other bidders had signed). Another case, Golden Cyce, LLC. v. Alln,No. CIV.A. 16301,
1998 Del Ch. LEXIS 80 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1998), concerns a confidentiality (and a standstill) agreement
required as a condition for obtaining access to target-firm information, which plaintiff bidder resisted
signing. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text. But in that case, it was alleged that other bidders
had already been given access to the information. See i
87. BBCAcquisition Corp., 623 A.2d at 90.
88. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985). The court
in Revlon said it was "significant that Forstmann, to Pantry Pride's exclusion, had been made privy to certain
Revlon financial data. Thus, the parties were not negotiating on equal terms." Id at 178.
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was likewise playing favorites with Cardinal, in a Revlon situation in
which a change in Durr ownership was inevitable. Yet the Revlon issue
was never mentioned in BBCAcquisition.
Why was it ignored? It appears that BBC Acquisition never raised
the issue of Durr-Fillauer's Revlon duties.89 Perhaps one should not fault
a court-even a court of equity like the Delaware Chancery Court-for
not considering an issue not raised, although one can wonder why the
plaintiff failed to raise it. It is possible that the plaintiff believed that
complaining as a shareholder made it more sympathetic than
complaining as a "hostile" raider. Section 220 and Revlon are not
mutually incompatible, however. The former defines statutory limits on
shareholder access to information, but does not in any way absolve
management of its common-law fiduciary duties to maximize
shareholder wealth when a takeover impends.
The opinion in BBC Acquisition underscores a true irony. In effect,
BBC was penalized for litigating as a shareholder of Durr, with its
demand for information treated solely under section 220 of the
Delaware statute. BBC's other status as a takeover bidder was ignored.
Had BBC Acquisition stressed its status as a bidder rather than a
shareholder, it would have been entitled to raise the fiduciary duties of
Durr management.9" But there is nothing in the law that requires a

89. This information comes from one of the lawyers involved in the BBCAcquisition litigation.
90. In Capit"l City Assoc., LPv. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appealdismissed as moot, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), plaintiff Capital City Associates (CCA) bid to acquire Interco, which resisted by
refusing to redeem "flip-in" and "flip-over" shareholder rights plans that hindered CCA from acquiring
Interco. CCA, which also owned Interco shares, challenged the refusal of Interco management to redeem
the rights plan as invalid under Unocal. The Delaware court agreed that Unocal had been violated, focusing
on CCA's raider, not shareholder, status:
While CCA is a shareholder, it here asserts interests as a buyer, not a seller of stock. The
question of a bidder/shareholder's right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to shareholders
does not often arise as a practical matter, because there are typically several stockholder
class actions that proceed on the same schedule as an action by the bidder. Therefore, to
my knowledge, this court has not been required to focus upon either the question whether
a bidder may enforce such rights, qua stockholder, or whether a bidder may, at least in some
circumstances, have some other state law source of right to enforce duties owed to
shareholders.
As the courts are principally concerned with interests of shareholders in actions in which
corporate fiduciary duties are tested, and as the interests of the shareholders of Interco in
this instance are implicated here to precisely the same extent as they would have been had
the pending class action been consolidated with this action, it seems to make little sense for
the court, having determined that the board now has a duty to shareholders to redeem the
rights, to fail to protect shareholders by not enforcing that duty specifically. Therefore, in
this case, I will hold that CCA, as a shareholder, has standing to assert the rights of a
shareholder of Interco to require the board to redeem the stock rights in issue.
Id. at 800 (footnote omitted).
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shareholder-raider to choose one set of legal provisions over another.
Section 220 and Revlon/Unocal duties are not mutually inconsistent."
Because BBCAcquisition (and other cases to be discussed below) never
consider shareholder-raider access to information in the Revlon context,
the courts implicitly assume that directors are entitled to the protections
of the business judgment rule, with access denied almost automatically.
Indeed, with that standard applied, the courts never inquire into what
might be motivating incumbent management's preference for a friendly
suitor rather than the hostile shareholder-raider. No explanation of
Durr management's preference for Cardinal is ever discussed. But in
friendly takeover deals it is at least conceivable that management will
receive benefits from the coming change of control or are otherwise on
both sides of the transaction. In those situations, an "entire fairness"
standard would attach to directors.92
But even when this highest standard is not applied, it does not follow
that the businessjudgment rule applies. In ranow v. Scientific Leasing,Inc.,
another Delaware case involving access to information, the Chancery
Court evaluated a non-raider shareholder challenge to a friendly
takeover, finding first that the board of target Scientific Leasing could
act disinterestedly.93 However, the court continued,

91. The ease of combining proper-purpose analysis with evaluation of management's fiduciary
duties can be seen in Bond Purchase, LLC v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties,
LP, 746 A.2d 842 (Del Ch. 1999).
Plaintiff, a limited partner in defendant limited partnership, sought a list of other limited partners as part
of an attempt to purchase more limited partnership interests (called Beneficial Unit Certificates, or BUCs)
in what the court called a "mini tender offer." Management of the limited partnership refused to provide
the information. Under the relevant section of the Delaware limited partnership statute, 6 Del. C. § 17305, plaintiff was required to show a proper purpose for the requested information. "In determining
whether a specific purpose is a 'proper purpose' under Section 17-305, this Court in the past has referred
to whether that purpose has been deemed a 'proper purpose' under 8 Del. C. § 220, which is the corporate
analogue to Section 17-305." 746 A.2d at 851 (footnote omitted). The Court held that seeking the
requested information to facilitate the tender offer was a proper purpose, but that management still had a
obligation to maximize the value ofthe firm to its shareholders, and withhold the information sought-even
if for proper purpose-if release of the information would damage the firm. On that basis, the court found
management's fear that completion of the mini tender offer would have adverse tax consequences for the
firm was sufficient basis to deny revelation of the information.
92. SeeWeinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
93. SeeYanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., No. CIV.A.9536, 9561, 1991 WL 165304 (Del Ch.July
31,1991), reprinted in 17 DEL.J. CORP. L. 549. In ranow,shareholders of target firm Scientific Leasing (SU)
complained ofshareholder-bidder LINC Group's preferential access to information. Another firm, Mediq,
was known to be interested in SLI, and LINC had indicated that it wanted to retain members of S11's
senior management upon acquiring SJ. Mediq was not given information available to LINC. Despite
the disparate treatment in favor of LINC, the court agreed with the S11 board that there were valid reasons
for the favorable treatment, and in addition found that the approach taken by the board was carefully
"designed to elicit the best available [bid]" and "did, in fact, obtain the highest [bid] available for its
shareholders." Id at * 11,
reprited in 17 DEL.J. CORP. L. at 680.
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from this it does not necessarily follow that the businessjudgment rule
is the appropriate standard of review. Where, as here, issues of
corporate control are at stake, the actions of even a disinterested
board must satisfy an enhanced level of scrutiny before they will
qualify for the deference that courts ordinarily accord to good-faith
business judgments. Our Supreme Court so held in Macmillan,
where it stated:
[Als we recognized in Unocal, where issues of corporate
control are at stake, there exists 'the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporations and its shareholders.'For that reason,
an 'enhanced duty' must be met at the threshold before the
board receives the normal protections of the business judgment
rule .94
Again, it is hard to square this general scrutiny of board action in the
face of control changes with the business-judgment standard applied
specifically to board denial of information to shareholder-raiders.9 5 If
the specter of management self-interest is omnipresent in any change of
control care; by definition it is present in shareholder-raider cases.
2. Other Cases
Subsequent Delaware cases have largely continued the approach of
BBCAcquisition in two important respects. First, shareholder attempts to
secure information other than shareholder lists for takeover-related
purposes are per se not a "proper purpose" under Delaware law.
Second, the overlap between the traditional law of shareholder access
to corporate information (statutorily requiring a "proper purpose") and
the Revlon/Unocal-based case law governing corporate takeovers
generally is not perceived. It is unclear how arduously plaintiffs in these
takeover-related cases advanced their claims to information on the basis
ofmanagement's fiduciary (Revlon/Unocal)duties, in addition to whatever
rights they had under section 220 of the Delaware statute. As will be

94. ranow, 1991 WL 165304, at "7, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 675-76 (quoting Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989), itselfquoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del 1985)) (citations omitted).
95. A board isnot required to sit by and run an auction passively. "It may never appropriately favor

one buyer over another for a selfish or inappropriate reason, such as occurred in Revlon, but it may favor
one over another if in good faith and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby
advanced." In re Fort Howard Corporation Shareholders Litigation, No. CIV.A.9991, 1988 WL 83147
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL.J. CORP. L. 699. For a specific application to shareholder
information access, see ranow, supra note 91.
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seen, however, Revlon was raised in at least one shareholder-raider case,
although the Delaware court ultimately did not consider its applicability.
a. Thomas & Belts Corp. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co.
In Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton. Manufacturing Co., publicly held
Thomas & Betts sought to acquire closely held Leviton. 96 Leviton
Manufacturing's shares were all family owned; Harold Leviton was the
president, CEO, and majority stockholder, and (with his wife) controlled
a voting trust representing 76.45% of the Leviton firm's voting stock.
Leviton refused to participate in Thomas & Betts' plan to buy Leviton
Manufacturing, so Thomas & Betts bought the Leviton shares of
Thomas Blumberg and his wife, Harold Leviton's niece.9 7 This gave
Thomas & Betts 29.1% of the Leviton shares, including the other
2 3 .55% of the voting stock. Ten months later, after attempting
unsuccessfully as a shareholder to interest the Leviton board in a
friendly acquisition, Thomas & Betts demanded inspection of various
Leviton books and records. When Leviton refused to provide the
information, litigation followed.
Thomas & Betts claimed its motive was to uncover waste and
mismanagement and to cause the firm to switch its accounting methods.
The Chancery Court found that Thomas & Betts' true aim "was to
further its plans for acquiring Leviton and that this interest was
antithetical to the interests of the corporation, "98 and thus that Thomas
& Betts lacked a proper purpose. Citing BBCAcquisition, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed.99
Thomas & Betts continues the pattern of BBC Acquisition: when a
shareholder-raider seeks access to corporate information, the takeover
motive constitutes an improper purpose under section 220. To reach
that conclusion, the Delaware court claimed without explanation (other
than citation to BBC Acquisition) that access to information would
damage the corporation (i.e., that a takeover posed a Situation I
problem). Equation of takeover with corporate damage is both
unfounded and irrelevant. Management has a duty to maximize value
to current shareholders. Even were it the case that the corporation

96. Se Thomas & Betts Corp v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996), affg 684 A.2d 702
(Del. Ch. 1995).
97. Further details of the Blumberg sale to Thomas & Betts are found in Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Blumberg,
660 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), in which Iviton Manufacturing challenged the Blumbergs'

disclosure of Leviton corporate documents to the purchaser, Thomas & Betts.
98. 681 A.2d at 1034.
99. Seeid at 1030n.1.
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would be damaged (worth less) under a subsequent ownership and
management regime, the new owners (Thomas & Betts) would bear the
consequences of their own subsequent policies. Of what concern is it to
the court that the later owners would find the value of their investment
diminished?
It is not suggested here that the outcome in Thomas &Betts was wrong.
Rather, the point is that the opinion limits its analysis to what access to
information is required under section 220 of the Delaware statute. As
in BBC Acquisition, Delaware law governing takeover-related fiduciary
duties was never discussed. Had it been, a court would probably not
have applied Revlon duties to evaluate the Leviton board's refusal to deal
with Thomas & Betts, because the firm was not on the brink of being
taken over. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in the Time-Warner
case, if "the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is found to
constitute only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the
00
corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered."'
But, the Time-Warner court continued, its decision in Unocal meant that
the business judgment rule would not apply automatically to the use of
a defensive tactic."'1 In this respect, too, it is likely that the Leviton
board's conduct would survive scrutiny.0 2 But directors' fiduciary duties
are not considered in Thomas & Betts. The refusal to provide
information is treated as governed solely by section 220, even though
the refusal occurs in the context of a takeover and so raises larger issues
of the board's duty to its shareholders.'
b. Golden Cycle, LL C. v. Global Motorsport Group, Inc.
The difficulty of reconciling BBCAcquisition with Revlon is again made
clear in a set of unreported Delaware decisions concerning Golden

100. Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
101. Seeid atll5ln.14.
102. Seid.atll51-52.
In Unocal, we held that before the business judgment rule is applied to a board's adoption
of a defensive measure, the burden will lie with the board to prove (a) reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed; and (b) that the
defensive measures adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.... We have
repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of
a board's business judgment.
Id at 1152. (citations omitted).
103. In that respect, it is worth noting that, although Harold Leviton controlled the votes of Leviton
Manufacturing, he did not own all the voting shares, nor all of the non-voting shares. Other shareholders
stood to gain from Thomas & Betts' attention, just as the Blumbergs had gained previously in selling their
shares to Thomas & Betts.
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Cycle's attempt to take over Global Motorsport (Global). °4 Golden
Cycle was formed inJanuary 1998 to acquire Global. By March, it had
acquired 10% of Global's shares, making it the single largest Global
shareholder. In late March, it approached the Global board with an
offer of $18 per share, 26 % above the market price. When the Global
board refused to negotiate,
Golden Cycle on April 4 commenced a
05
hostile tender offer. 1
In the meantime, the Global board had engaged an investment
banking firm to advise it as to "various possible alternatives to maximize
stockholder value for the immediate future."'' 1 6 To that end,
management provided the investment firm with corporate information.
On April 9 and 11, the board heard the investment firm's advice,
rejected Golden Cycle's offer, and determined "to explore alternatives
available to it to maximize stockholder value," although "without
making any decision to sell the Company or to engage in a business
combination with another Company."'0 7 On April 13, the board
announced publicly that it had rejected the Golden Cycle offer, and that
it had authorized management to consider alternatives to maximize
shareholder value, "including entering into discussions with other parties
who have expressed an interest in acquiring the Company at a more
attractive price" than Golden Cycle's offer.
To that end, Global would permit those expressing an interest in the
company, including Golden Cycle, to examine various pieces of
corporate information. Access was conditioned, however, on signing a
standstill agreement not to acquire or offer to acquire Global stock for
two years. Golden Cycle then filed for a preliminary injunction
requiring production of the information unconditioned by the standstill
agreement. The Delaware Chancery Court, for once, mentioned the
board's Revlon duties:
Golden Cycle contends that the Board's dealings with actual and
potential bidders must be evaluated by whether they are reasonably
calculated to maximize stockholder value in the sale of the Company.

104. &e Golden Cycle, L.L.C. v. Global Motorsport Group, Inc., No. CIV.A.16292, 1998 Del Ch.
LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch.June 18, 1998); Golden Cycle, LLC. v. Allan, No. CIV.A. 16301,1998 WL 276224

(Del. Ch.May 20,1998); Golden Cycle, LL.C. v. Allan, No. CIV.A.16301, 1998 WL892631 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 10, 1998).
105. Golden Cycle also announced it would pursue a consent solicitation campaign with
shareholders, an aspect of the case not discussed here.

106. 1998 WL 276224, at*3.
107. lM.
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Plaintiff contends that a sale of the Company is inevitable,
therefore, the Board's duty has "change [d] from the preservation of
[the Company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."'to,
Denying the motion for a preliminary injunction on May 20, the
Chancery Court took no position on whether Revlon applied. Even if it
did, the board had satisfied any Revlon duties. 0 9
A full trial on the matter began May 22, two days after denial of the
preliminary injunction. The same day, however, Global announced
that it had signed a letter of intent to sell itself for $23 per share."'
Golden Cycle continued to press for the information, but in June the
Chancery Court found for defendant Global. Gone was any discussion
of Revlon; the matter was decided solely on the basis of BBCAcquisition.
As the parties recognize, this case is closely analogous to Vice
Chancellor Jacob's decision in BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer
Medica Inc. ... As is true here, the target company in BBCAcquisition
had entered into a higher priced transaction with a third party, and
the plaintiff sought information to determine whether or not to raise
its bid.... The Court determined that, as a matteroflaw, this purpose
was not reasonably related to the plaintiff's interest as a shareholder,
and therefore was not a proper purpose within the meaning of Section
220.
BBC Acquisition is not readily distinguishable from the present
application. Here, plaintiff Golden Cycle was formed only recently,
and specifically for the purpose of acquiring Global.... I find that
Golden Cycle's stated purpose for its demand is not a purpose related
to its interests as a stockholder, as is required in a Section 220
demand.'
Noteworthy in the Chancery Court's opinion is the total reliance on
BBC Acquisition and thus the absence of any consideration of Revlon,
although the Revlon issue had been raised just days earlier in the denial
of the preliminary injunction. There was no doubt that sale of Global
was inevitable, since the firm itself had signed a letter of intent to be
acquired. Plaintiffs sought the information to study the possibility of a

108. Id.at *5, * 11 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1985)). Golden Cycle also sought a preliminary injunction as to other matters not of importance here.
109. See id at *11 ("[A]ssuming, arguendo, that Revlon duties apply in the current situation, as long
as the Board acts with care and in the good faith pursuit of shareholder interest, it may tilt the playing field,
and, at least for some period of time, keep Golden Cycle at arms-length.").
110. Se 1998 Del Ch.LEXIS 92, at *2. The identity of the acquiror was not revealed in the letter
opinion. But see infta
note 117.
111. 1998 Del Ch. LEXIS 92, at *4-*6 (emphasis added).
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higher bid. But to the Chancery Court in Golden Cycle, that merely
increased the similarity of the case to BBCAcquisition: "As in the present
action, the plaintiff in BBC Acquisition did not increase its offer in
response to the higher-bid; rather, it took the position that it needed
access to the same information provided the other bidder in order to
decide whether to increase its bid.""' 2 In such a situation, given that
shareholders were about to surrender their shares anyway, it is difficult
to believe that other shareholders would not want Golden Cycle to have
access to the information it sought. Shareholders had nothing to lose
and everything to gain from its disclosure." 3
Again, this is not to say that shareholders would always want
shareholder-raiders to have easy access to such information. When the
information would help a bidder establish the firm's reservation price,
shareholders might want the information withheld. Golden Cycle
sought two sorts of information that would predictably be very useful in
that respect: (a) "[d]ocuments relating to any proposal or offer to
acquire or to sell [Global], its stock or more than 50% of the assets of
[Global] (determined by value or by revenue production);" and (b)
"[d] ocuments showing valuations, projections or business plans relating
to [Global], its stock or its assets."' 4 Thus, denial of the information to
Golden Cycle when it appeared as the first suitor for Global may well
have justified denial of the preliminary injunction." 5 (Likewise, it would
appear from the opinion in Thomas & Betts that the shareholder-raider
demanding information was the first, and perhaps the only, bidder on
the scene.)
But the shareholder demand for information was rejected in Golden
Cycle, not because revelation of the information would impede
management's obtaining the best price for Global's shares, but because
"as a matter oflaw" a shareholder-seeking access to corporate information
112. Id.at*4n.l.
113. To repeat a point made earlier, seesupranote 85, denial ofthe information might well bejustified
as part of the inducements necessary to obtain a bid in the first place. But that is not the basis on which
the Delaware court resolved Golden Cycle's complaint. See id at *4-*6. As also noted, refusal to supply
the information seemingly would not fulfill the Global board's Rvlon duties, as Global had already agreed
to be acquired. See id An interesting case in that respect isCM&MGroup, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788
(Del. 1982). Shareholder Carroll sought inspection of CM & M books and records, for purposes of valuing
his investment but also to use the information to interest a third-party buyer in CM & M. Distinguishing
primary from secondary purposes, the Delaware court held that Carroll's desire to interest a buyer in CM
& M was only secondary. Had it been primary, the analysis here would indicate that, in what was
apparently a non-Revlon situation, management should decide whether the information should be disclosed
so as ultimately to interest a potential buyer.
114. Id. at *2.
115. However, by the time the preliminary injunction was denied, Global's share price had risen to
$20, suggesting that the firm was in play once Golden Cycle's bid of $18 two months earlier (a 26 percent
premium over market) had been rejected.

2000]

ACCESS TO CORPORATE INFORMATION

1235

lacks a proper purpose. 6 That is, even when release of the information
might lead to shareholders' obtaining a higher price (as was true in BBC
Acquisition and Golden Cycle), the information legally could not be
released. Particularly as Golden Cycle had raised the issue of Global's
Revlon duties, it is difficult to see why access to the information
demanded would be denied solely on the basis of section 220 (as
interpreted in BBC Acquisition). 7

116. See 1998 Del Ch. LEXIS 92, at *5 (emphasis added). See also supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
117. Golden Cycle revisited the well one more time, when the issue ofRevlon duties was again raised
by the court but not held to be particularly important under new facts in the case. In Goldn Cycle LLC
v. Allan, No. CIV.A.16301, 1998 WL 892631, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998), it sought an injunction
against Global's being acquired by another bidder, complaining again of the prior rebuff to its attempt to
acquire information. The agreement worked out in June 1998 (with Fremont Partners, the December
opinion reveals) had fallen through. The Global board then negotiated in November a new agreement for
Global to be acquired by Stonington. As before, Global would not negotiate with Golden Cycle, which
Golden Cycle protested in its continued litigation. The Chancery Court upheld the Global board's
decision:
The strikingly unusual aspect of this case isthe fact that the Global board twice approved
merger agreements without contacting Cycle, a party known to be interested in acquiring
Global, and offering it an opportunity to bid higher. At first glance, it seems incongruous
to conclude that directors can fulfill their Revlon duties without contacting a known
interested party who might be willing to offer more. However, in the peculiar circumstances
here, including the fact that the terms of the Stonington Merger Agreement do not preclude
a higher bid, I am persuaded that the directors did so.
.... Most importantly, Cycle's briefs gloss over the fact that Cycle made a strategic decision,
on or shortly after October 5, 1998, that it would no longer deal directly with the Global
Board. Cycle levels a broadside attack at what it characterizes as the Board's selective,
preferential and exclusive dealing with Stonington, citing the Board's failure to contact
Cycle after Cycle issued the October 27 press release and before it approved the Stonington
Merger Agreement. Cycle fails to acknowledge that these decisions were importantly
influenced by Cycle's own decision to disengage from the Board. In effect, Cycle went
AWOL but now seeks leave to criticize the actions taken by the Board to compensate for
Cycle's refusal to participate. In myjudgment, these considerations seriously undermine the
credibility of Cycle's arguments on this preliminary injunction motion.
It is also disturbing to me that Cycle's decision to disengage from the Board's process has
deprived this proceeding (or at least important aspects of it) of a firm grounding in reality.
We do not know that would have happened if Cycle had signed the confidentiality
agreement. We do not know what would have happened if Cycle had made a nonbinding
indication of interest to the Board at a price above $18 per share. Instead of presenting a
factual record on these matters, Cycle asks me to join it in speculating that, if Cycle had
signed the confidentiality agreement proffered on October 5 and again on October 29,
Global nevertheless would have erected barriers to Cycle's due diligence and its
participation in the Board-created process. Is it appropriate to adjudicate questions relating
to the Board's satisfaction of its Revlon duties in such a hypothetical way? In my view, it
isnot. Rather, as the cases make clear, decisions in this context on motions for preliminary
injunction are, of necessity, highly fact specific. For these reasons, I find myself unable to
give much weight or credence to Cycle's attacks on the Board process.
Id. at *14-*15. In short, having been rebuffed in its two previous attempts to acquire information, Golden
Cycle gave up.
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c. NiSource CapitalMarkets, Inc. v. CapitalEnergy Group
The distinction between information a shareholder would and would
not want released is made clearer in a more recent Delaware Chancery

case, ]ViSource CapitalMarkets,Inc. v. CapitalEnergy Group." 8 Hostile-bidder
NiSource sought "highly confidential information" from Capital Energy
Group (CEG). Refusing to compel production of the documents, the
court explained:
The information sought by plaintiffs (that I have reviewed in camera)
would disclose CEG's reservation price and would effectively remove
the possibility of arms length bargaining between the parties. If this
Court orders CEG's internal valuations to be disclosed, NiSource's
offers will likely not exceed the value CEG places on its own stock,
despite NiSource's potential willingness to pay more per share,
because the bidder will not offer a price per share that exceeds the
value the target itself places on its own stock. Consequently, because
NiSource will tailor its offers to CEG's own valuations, the CEG
shareholders may lose an opportunity to receive a premium that

NiSource might have paid...." 119

Here, although once again the result is non-revelation of information,
the Delaware court correctly interprets when and why other
shareholders would not want information to be revealed to shareholderraiders in a takeover situation.
But conversely, the courts seem not to understand when shareholders
would want that information revealed, despite the guidance provided by
Revlon/Unocal. Providing the information sought by BBC Acquisition
and Golden Cycle seemingly could only increase shareholder value.
Shareholders as a group in those two cases would hardly consider the
shareholder-raider's purpose "improper." And under Revlon, because a
basic change in firm ownership impended, management seemingly
would have an obligation to provide the information.

118. No. CMV.A.17341, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198 (Del. Ch., Sept. 24, 1999). NiSource was
apparently not a shareholder itself in the case, but other plaintiffs were. The court's opinion treats the nonshareholder raider and plaintiff shareholders alike.
119. Id. at*2-*3. The discussion here seems the sort of analysis that one would expect under Revlon.
It is perhaps of interest, therefore, that neither side's briefs in .NiSource raised Revlon.
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D. Shareholder-RaiderMotives in Acquiring Shares
In addition to the difficulties already noted, the opinions on
shareholder-raider access to corporate books and records present several
other points of dubious validity. One of these has already been noted
in the discussion of Thomas & Betts, the claim that facilitating a raider's
acquisition of the firm damages the corporation. The court in Thomas
& Betts did not explain exactly how this would happen. If it meant only
that sometimes providing information to a shareholder-raider may not
be in the interest of shareholders as a group, that is of course true, as
explained in NiSource. But from its unexplained claim that providing
information to the shareholder was "antithetical to the interests of the
corporation,"' 20 plus the statement (both in Thomas &Betts and the other
cases discussed above) that acquisition of information to further a
takeover is never a proper purpose, one must infer that the Delaware
courts believe that access to information for shareholder-raiders is
always injurious to the firm.
To the contrary, providing a raider information is sometimes just
what shareholders would want. The claim is also difficult to understand
as a matter of statutory interpretation. Courts order production of
information to further changes of control in the context of proxy fights,
for example, deeming access in those cases a "proper purpose."' 2' And
even if a change of control were injurious, why should it matter? Under
Revlon, as long as shareholders maximize the value of their shares, the
fact that the raider acquires an "injured" firm should be of no
consequence to the courts.
One other aspect of the shareholder-raider information access cases
bears consideration. The opinions discussed above regularly denigrate
the raider for purchasing its shares to use shareowner status to pry
information out of the target firm. The Delaware court's disparaging
reference in BBC Acquisition to plaintiff BBC's merely "nominal stock
interest" that was not a "pre-existing investment" shows that
shareholder-raider motives mattered in that case. Motive is likewise a
factor in the other cases discussed. "Thomas & Betts acquired its shares
in Leviton with the acknowledged purpose of acquiring the
company."' 2 "[P]laintiff Golden Cycle was formed only recently, and
specifically for the purpose of acquiring Global. Its acquisition of

120. Thomas& Betts Corp v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026,1034 (Del. 1996), affg 684 A.2d 702
(Del. Ch. 1995).
121. See
supra notes 48 to 55 and accompanying text.
122. Thomas & Betts, 681 A.2d at 1032.
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Global stock was made
entirely for the purpose of facilitating the
' 23
acquisition of Global."'

Consideration of how large and lengthy an interest a shareholder
possesses, is a feature of some state corporation statutes." 4 But as Clark
notes, "[t]o its credit, the corresponding Delaware statute, Section 220
of the Delaware General Corporate Law, makes no discriminations
' 25
among shareholders on the basis of size or length of holdings."'
Noting that Delaware instead distinguishes between shareholder lists
and corporate books and records, Clark then says of the former:
Shareholders often want a shareholder list in order to mount a proxy
contest or to make a tender offer, both of which are viewed with
horror by incumbent management but may very well be in the
economic interest of all the shareholders. In these situations
management almost instinctively resists 2inspection,
even though there
6
is little or no legitimate basis for delay.

The same thing is of course true of many requests for books and records.
They will be resisted by management, but "very well may be in the
economic interests of all the shareholders."' 27 Which is why Delaware
has defined Revlon/Unocal duties in takeover situations.
The issue of shareholder motivation has apparently led the Delaware
Chancery Court to hold now that management denial of information
sought by a shareholder-raider will never be invalidated. InJ'VSource, the
court spoke of a board's "immunity" when management refuses
shareholder-raider demands for books and records:
The defendants have also raised a question as to the motivation
behind plaintiffs' request for discovery ....

This Court has always

123. Golden Cycle, L.L.C. v. Global Motorsport Group, Inc., No. CIV.A.16292, 1998 Del Ch.
LEXIS 92, at *5 (Del. Ch.June 18, 1998).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1986). Although such provisions have
disappeared from the current Model Business Corporation Act, section 52 ofthe 1969 version ofthe Model
Act did contain provisions that gave more favorable access to shareholders with larger and longer share

ownership.
125. Clark, supra note 18,§3.1,at99.
126. Id. § 3.1, at 99-100.
127. The Delaware courts' unexplained, and statutorily unjustified, focus on shareholder motive has
created a side-show in many cases that ultimately works to incumbent management's advantage. Because
cases like BBC have created a virtual per serule against shareholder-raider access to books and records for
the purpose of furthering a takeover, even in a situation when Revlon would require disclosure of the

information, shareholders have been forced to proclaim other, transparently implausible, motives for

seeking access to information. Courts point to this shareholder obfuscation of their true motivation in
denying access to information. In Thomas & Beuts,
for example, the Delaware court quickly dismissed
plaintiff's claim that it wanted the information to impel a change in Leviton's accounting methods. See681
A.2d at 1034. Given the per se holdings against allowing shareholder-raiders access to information, it is
hardly surprising that plaintiffs advance patently false reasons for seeking access.
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been hesitant to grant discovery where the information disclosed may
not be used for proper legal purposes, but rather for practical business
advantages.... The Court's desire to prevent this sort of behavior,
and its emphasis on maintaining a level playing field for both bidder
and target, has often lead this Court to narrowly tailor discovery. It
is largely this concern that gave rise to the business strategy immunity, and
it is in this spirit as well that I deny plaintiffs' discovery request. 128
As noted above, denial of access to the information sought in NiSource
was almost certainly a good thing for shareholders. The information, if

obtained, could be used to figure out the target firm's reservation price.
But it is one thing to uphold refusal of access on the basis of the facts of
one case, and another to speak of a general "business strategy
access to
immunity," applicable to any shareholder-raider 1seeking
29
information, based on the shareholder's motivation.
Two final aspects of this jurisprudence are curious. First, when a

shareholder seeks access to shareholder lists rather than corporate books
and records, the fact that the shareholder purchased its shares as part of

an overall takeover campaign has repeatedly been held irrelevant, even
if the purchase was recent and for a nominal amount. This has long
been clear in Delaware,130 and has become the law elsewhere. Ordering

128. NiSource Cap. Mkts. v. Columbia Energy Group, No. CIV.A.17341, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS

198, at *7-*8 (Del. Ch., Sept. 24, 1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
129. "Immunity" is a troublesome concept in a broader sense. Even when a board is disinterested,
directors will still be liable for gross negligence. Not often, but occasionally, directors are found liable for
gross negligence. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Naturally, when mere
negligence isthe standard, directors may also be liable for their disinterested decisions. See e.g. ,Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). Ifdirectors have no "immunity" in their disinterested decisions, how can they
have immunity in takeover situations? As already quoted,
where issues of corporate control are at stake, there exists "the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporations and
its shareholders." For that reason, an "enhanced duty" must be met at the threshold before
the board receives the normal protections of the business judgment rule.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1988) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
130. S e.g., Mite Corp v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969):
Heli-Coil is a "take-over" target for Mite which wants to solicit offers from other Heli-Coil's
stockholders to exchange their stock for stock of Mite. On July 2, 1969 Mite became a
holder of record of 100 shares of Heli-Coil. The next day it made demand for the list.
.... lt is settled Delaware law that inspection of a stock list is proper where it is sought in
order to purchase additional shares of a company's stock from other stockholders. And it
is not made improper because the first shares were purchased as a prelude to a demand for
the list.
It follows as a matter of law that Mite is entitled to the stock list and judgment on the
pleadings will therefore be entered in its favor as to the complaint.
Id. at 856 (citations omitted). See also Bond Purchase, LL.C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties, L.P., 746
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production of shareholder lists and related information in MMI
Investments, LL.C v. Eastern Co., the Connecticut court stated that "even
if MMI desired control of Eastern from the start, there is nothing
unlawful about that purpose and Eastern does not cite any cases that
state the contrary.
Second, to return to a point discussed above, it should be irrelevant
in terms of a board's fiduciary (Revlon/Unocal) duties why a raider has
acquired its shares. Once the firm is in play, the board's obligation to
shareholders is to maximize the return that shareholders will realize
from the impending change of control. Outsiders contemplating a
takeover often acquire shares in the contemplated target prior to
launching a takeover.'32 Recognition that "toe-hold" share purchases
are often made to acquire control of the firm has motivated
promulgation of SEC Schedule 13D, requiring those acquiring five
percent of the ownership of a public company to make disclosures about
the purpose of their acquisition. 33 But there is no economic or legal
reason that a board should approach its Revlon duties differently when
a would-be acquiror chooses to purchase shares before attempting the
takeover.134 Thus, in the Revlon context, it makes no sense for a court to
consider the motives of Ms. Shareholder in acquiring her shares.
Shareholder's motives have nothing to do with the price that
management can obtain for its shareholders. In fact, a bidder's
acquiring shares in anticipation of launching the takeover bid is good
news for shareholders seeking the highest return on their investment.

A.2d 842 (Del Ch. 1999), discussed in note 90, supra, in which the court considered the fact that plaintiff
limited partner seeking information from limited partnership had purchased its Beneficial Unit Certificate
to launch a mini tender offer for other limited partners' BUCs. Said the judge, "I do not consider Bond's
purpose to be made improper because it might have purchased its BUC as a prelude to a demand for the
Investor List." 746 A.2d at 851.
131. 701 A.2d 50, 59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996); Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 346 N.E.2d 507, 513
(N.Y. 1976)(citation omitted).
132. For example, prior to launching its hostile tender offer for Walt Disney shares in 1984, Saul
Steinberg purchased a sizeable proportion (some 12 percent) of Disney shares. See
gmraly McChesney,
supra note 70. Jay Pritzker insisted on the purchase of 1.75 million (ultimately reduced to I million shares)
of Trans Union as a condition for his takeover bid. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
133. SeeSecurities Exchange Act, Rule 13-d, Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1, 240.13d.-7. See
Jonathan R. Macey &Jeffrey M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatoy rWess, 65 WASH. U. LQ. 131
(1987). Regulation 13D is rather ironic in the context of bidder.shareholder information, since 13D's
disclosure requirements "in fact cause bidders to provide [other] shareholders with new and useful
information about bidders' intentions." Id. at 132 (footnote omitted).
134. The most obvious reason why a potential acquiror would buy shares before making the takeover
offer is the financial hedge that share ownership provides against being outbid by another acquiror. The
first bidder for a firm puts the firm in play, but will only do so to the extent that it will profit from its efforts.
If ultimately outbid, the firm will only lose, having invested in putting the offer together--unless it
purchases shares that appreciate when sold to the ultimate acquiror paying a higher price.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to believe that the current law of shareholder-raider
access to information constitutes a sustainable equilibrium. The law is
too anomalous in too many ways. In Delaware, section 220's
requirement of a "proper purpose" (the requirement in Model Act
jurisdictions also) is currently used to deny a shareholder-raider
information in situations where shareholders collectively would want the
information turned over. Obtaining information for a proxy fight to
oust management or to effectuate a change of control via an outside
tender offer is a proper purpose, but obtaining other information to
facilitate a shareholder-raider's own offer is not a proper purpose.
Section 220 automatically defeats shareholder-raider attempts at
information, when under Revlon the same information might have to be
disclosed to a non-shareholder raider. Shareholder-raider motives, plus
the length and size of share holdings, are deemed important, even
though such considerations are irrelevant in any other context.
None of this is to say that, in a takeover context, target-firm
management should always be required to accede to shareholder
demands for information. As discussed, a negotiator's optimal use of
information will sometimes call for more disclosure, sometimes for less.
Faithful mangers may well conclude that value maximization for
shareholders demands withholding information. A shareholder who
happens to disagree with that strategy should not be allowed to interfere
with what faithful management-more specialized in the governance of
the firm, and entrusted by shareholders as a group with making controlrelated decisions-has decided.
Rather, the foregoing is to argue that court decisions (including,
notably, decisions from Delaware courts) do not distinguish when
shareholders would and would not want their firms to release
information other than shareholder lists to hostile bidders. The
decisions recite by rote that information need not be provided to raidershareholders because their purpose is not "proper" under section 220.
But shareholders themselves would not adopt such a rule. Rather, they
would hold their board of directors to the duties outlined in
Revion/Unocal once a takeover looms. Maximization of shareholder
value may or may not demand release of corporate information to a
would-be acquiror. But the per se ability to resist demands for
information under section 220 would never be the rule chosen by
shareholders, any more than they would choose a rule of noncooperation with higher-bidding offerors generally.
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Hence, section 220 is not helpful in resolving when shareholderraiders should have access to corporate information. Whether a
shareholder-raider's purpose is proper under the statute should depend
on whether it will help or hinder in obtaining the highest price available
for the target firm's shares, the standard already embodied in the
fiduciary duties of Revion/Unocal. Not only does section 220 not help in
shareholder-raider situations, it can actually thwart the goal of
maximizing shareholder returns, as cases like BBCAcquisition and Golden
Cycle demonstrate.

